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A PRUDENTIAL TAKE ON A PRUDENTIAL
TAKINGS DOCTRINE
Katherine Mims Crocker*
The Supreme Court is set to decide a case requesting reconsideration of a
doctrine that has long bedeviled constitutional litigants and commentators.
The case is Knick v. Township of Scott, and the doctrine is the "ripeness" rule
from Williamson County Regio nal Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank
that plaint~ffs seeking to raise takings claims under the Fifth Amendment must
pursue state-created remedies first- the so-called "compensation prong" (as
distinguished from a separate "takings prong"). This Essay argues that to put
the compensation prong in the best light possible, the Court should view the
requirement as a "prudential" rule rather than (as it has previously done) a
constitutional one. It then arg ues that the Court should reject this doctrine not
because it is a prudential rule, which would follow a larger trend in recent case
discussions, but because it is a bad prudential rule. This path is the prudential
one because casting doubt on prudential rules more generally could cause a
significant set of additional doctrines to suffer unintended and unwelcome
consequences.
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INTRl)D1.:CTll)N

The Supreme Court is set to
a case requesting reconsideration of
a doctrine that stands as a "major barrier[] to federal court adjudication" of
plaintiffs' constitutional rights. 1 The case is Knick v, Township of Scott,' and
the doctrine is the rule from Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank3 that plaintiffs
to raise
claims
under the Fifth Amendment must pursue state-created remedies
I call
this rule the "compensation prong"
Williamson County also
articulated a "takings prong," which I describe below),
This
advances two arguments, The first is that the Court should
view the compensation prong as a "prudential" rule rather than a
constitutional one, Williamson County described the compensation prong as
a "ripeness" requirenu:nt,
that it prevents courts from deciding
as
disputes that are not ready for review. Courts sometimes think

a constitutiona1 command grounded in Artide III's case-or-controversy
limitation. With respect to the compensation prong, however, courts
sometimes think of
as a different kind of constitutional coJrnnnruJd,
one grounded in the Fifth Amendment Alternatively, courts sometimes
think of ripeness not as a constitutional command at

all~

but as a principle

grounded in prudential, or policy. considerations.
What 1 call the Williamson County "ripeness puzzle" asks to which of
these categories courts should view the compensation prong as belonging.'
For mainly consequentialist reasons, I argue that a prudential solution puts
the rule in the best
possible, The Supreme Court should thus view the
compensation prong as "a self-imposed, common law limit on federal
jurisdiction designed to foster core values" of federalism
inherent
in providing state courts the first
at property disputes, 5
The second argument that
Essay advances is that the Supreme Court
should abandon the compensation prong-but that it should also proceed
with caution, For although the reqnirement may sound like a narrow issue of
narrow concern, doing away with it coutd threaten to disrupt or in some
instances destroy rules including the political-question doctrine, the general
prohibition against third-party standing, and many more, 6

1. Thomas W" Mcrrili, Essa)', Anficipaiory ReerJedies ,,im
1630, 1633 (2015),
2.

862 E3d 310, 314 {Jd Cir. 2017), cer!. grante.;tin

3.

473

4.

Fur a more detailed discussion of this "ripeness

128 IL\RV. L. R.EV.

138$. Ct. 1262 (2018) (mcm.),

u.s. 172 (1985].
" see Katherine Mims

Crocker, ju51ifyi11ga Prudential Solution to the Williamson County Ripeness Puzzle, 49 GA. L
REV. 163
5.

fred 0. Smith,

Jr, Uruiemocra!i;: &ttntint, 70 VANLJ. L. REv. 845, 853 (2017).

6. The Court
have
cerr in Knkk for the very purpose of ahobshing the
cnmpcnsation prong.
its consJJeratlon of the case tn the reconsideration
cerl on J. m:parate ground for review. See Petition for \Vrit of Certiorari at I.
Scott, No. 17-647 i U.S, Oct. 31, 1017) (presenting a second question
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There are two key ways that the compensation prong, understood as
prudential in character, could come to an end in Knick. First, the Court
could
the doctrine simply because it rests on prudential concerns, a
relatively broad ruling. Doing so would follow a trend in recent case
discussions denigrating prudential rules in the jurisdictional context

Secon•d, the Court could reject the balance of policy priorities underlying the
doctrine, a relatively narrow ruling. In other words, the Court could scrap
the compensation prong not because it ls a prudential principle, but because

it is a bad prudential principle.
I argue, again for consequentialist reasons, that the second option
provides the more prudential path forward, for the first option could cause a
sweeping assortment of doctrines to suffer unintended and unwelcome

consequences. In Knick, therefore, the Court should regard the
compensation prong as prudential in character but renounce it on otber
grounds. And beyond Knick, the Court should reconsider other purportedly
prudential limitations on federal jurisdiction in cases that more squarely
present them.

These arguments unfold as follows. Part I describes the decisional
backgronnd leading up to Knick. Part II outlines the case for a prudential
characterization of the compensation prong. Part Ill discusses the recent
trend toward repudiating prudential principles. Part IV outlines a prudential
path lorward. I conclude that the Court should forsake the compensation
prong in Knick not because it is a prudential rule, but because it is a bad
prudential rule. I further rondude that the Court should adopt a
particularized approach to
prudential principles beyond the
present matter.
I.

FROM WILLIAMSON COUNTY TO KNICK

Court has decided two major compensation-prong cases:

The

Williamson County in 1985 and San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of
San Francisco' in 2005.
In Williamson County, a bank seeking to develop land asserted that

county zoning requirements violated the Takings Clause of the Fiftb
Amendment,' which says that "private property" shall not be "taken for
use~

\vithout just compensation. "9 The bank sued
won in
court, but the Supreme Court held the bank's claim improper. 10
public

regarding a
circuit split over the rn;.atmcnt uf facial takings claims). And the grant
came on
c.f a dissent from the denial of ccrt in
Gnierprtscs v, Town o_f
Durham, in which lwu fustkes pressed their coUeagucs to rethink
pmn~ See
136 S. Ct. 1409 (20! 6) {Thomas,)., joined by Kennedy,)., dl<>;entlngtro;;n <i~nlal

7.
8.
9.
10.
~in

545 us :12> (2005).
WilliamsOti Cty., 473 U.S. at 175.
U.S. CONST. atncnd. V.
ti/i?Uamson

favor of

re~:mnder•tl

473 U5. at175, 200

was

rejected

by

rhc Distrkr

that "[a]tthough lhe

which

verdict

a

judgment
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Williamson County articulated two rules, First, the Court said, a federal
takings claim "is not ripe until the government entity charged with
implementing the regnlations has reached a final decision regarding the
application of the regnlations to the property at issue," meaning
prospective plaintiffs must obtain such decisions before suing.U I call this the
"takings prong" because the textual hook to the Fifth Amendment, to the
extent that one existed, was that it is impossible for property to be "taken"

before a final dedsion occurs. 12

Second (and more significantly for present purposes), the Court said,
"[t]he Filth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it
proscribes taking without just compensation," 13 And "all that is required" to
permit the possibility of just compensation, the Court continued, "is that a
'reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation'
exist at the time of the taking."''' The Court held that prospective plaintiffs
must pursue such mechanisms to
their dain1s~ which couJd include
suing under an "inverse-condemnation" cause of action in state court 15 I call

this the "compensation prong" because the textual hook to the Fifth
Amendment was that "no constitutional violation occurs until just
compensation has been denied, "16
The Supreme Court returned to the compensation prong in San Remo
Hotel, holding that issues decided in state courts by virtue of Williamson
effect in later federal suits." The facts and procedural
Count'yhave
history of San Remo Hotel are complex, but the plaintiffs unsuccessfully
pursued unripe federal takings claims in federal court, unsuccessfully
litigated state takings daims in state court, and then unsuccessfully
attempted to reas.o;ert their federal takings claims in federal courL 18 The
Supreme Court affirmed the application of issue preclusion under the Full
Faith and Credit Statute to turn aside the second federal suit. 19
The
in San Remo Hotel was twofold, First, the Court
explained that courts may not "simply create exceptions" to the statute

nolwilhstan,llng the verdict to petitioners, the verdict was reinstated on Bfl'flt!al" and
umduding that
claim was prcrnaturc).
11. ld. at H!ti
12.

See id. at 190-91.

13.

Id" at 194.

14.

ld. (q\loting Ro:g'l Rail Reorganization Ad Otl!C£, 419 U.S. 102, 124-125 ( 1974)},

15. ld. at t94-96; see Inverse Condemnution, BLACK's LAW DrcrrONARY (lOth ed. 2014)
(defining: inverse condemnation as "[ajn action
prc>PCJ'tv <1wrrcrforcompensat:ion
propt'Tty Y.i!hout bringing formal
from a governmental cntily that has taken the

condemnation proceedl11gs").
16. lrVilliamson Cty., 473 L'.S. at 194 n.B (en>pl>.si<
17. San Remo Hotel. L,P. v, Cily & Cty. of San Fnmdsco, 545 U.S. 323,347-48 {2005).
IR ld. at 330-35.
19.

ld. at 347-43..
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wherever they ~deem them appropriate."'" Second, the Court reasoned that
the Ia w does no! require a federal forum for all federal claims. Instead, the
Court said that " [s]tate comts are fully competent to adjudicate
constitutional
to local land-use decisions" and that "state courts
undoul:>tedly have more
than federal courts do in
the
complex factual, technical, and legal questions" underlying some pr<lperty
disputes. 21
Chief
Rehnquist,
by three others, concurred in the
judgment, Rehnquist urged his colleagues to revisit the compensation prong,
observing that the upshot of San Remo Hotel was that "litigants who go to
stale court to seek compensation will likely be unable later to assert their
federal takings claims in federal court.""
Fast-forward to K11ick, the pending case. Rose Mary Knick ov.'Tls land in
the
of Scott, Pennsylvania. 23
township enacled an ordinance
reqmrmg
all cemeteries be "open and accessible to the general public
during daylight hours." 24 Government officials entered Knick's land and
declared her in violation of the ordinance because certain stones on her
property were believed to be grave markers.25 Knick sued the township in
federal court,
Fifth Amendment takings claims.26 The district court
held the claims unripe under the compensation prong because Knick had
not sought compensation in an inverse-condemnation action in state courtP
The Third Circuit aftlrmed,28 and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the
case. 20 Oral argument occurred on October 3, 2018.'" and a decision should
come down by June 2019.

20.
21.

ld- at 344,
1d. at 347,

22. ld. at 351 {Rehnquist, Cl., _ioined by O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.,
mncurdnu in the
Of note. the Court decided Kelo v.
Umdon, 545 l!.K
469
and
v. Chevron U5"'t Inc., 544 U.S. 528 {2005),
Hotel. "raken
these three decisions represent a suhstafitia~ chang<!-<:nti,.-ely
direction of relegating takings issues tn the political anti legal ,iudgmcnts
states."
A. Fletcher, Keynote Address, Keto, Liogle, anti San Rcmo Hotel: Takings Ltnv Now Belongs to

the Stales, 46 SAl\"TA CLARA L .REV. 767,776 (2006).
23. Knkkv.
Ct. 1262 {2018)

ofScott,862F3d310,3l5(3dClr.2tl17).,cert

24.

Id.

25.

hi. Knick has prcvinnsl;v dls;>olcdthat there b: a cemetery nn her land. Td.

26.
27.
t:l, 2016).

13SS.

[d_ aL315-16.
Knick v. Twp. of Scott, No. 3:14-CV -02223,2016 WL 4701549, at '"6-lM.D. Pa. S.:pt.

28.

Kmck, 8.62 F.3d at 328.

29.

Knid v. Twp. n(Smu, l3R S. ct. 1262 (20U?) {mend (granting cerlinrari).

30.

Supreme Court of ibt• Urtiit'd Simes: October Term 2018, SUP. CT. (July 9, 2mB},
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TflE CASE HJR A PRUDENTfAL Ctl ARAGl'ERfZA'rtON

As I have discussed in prior work, the Williamson
ripeness
puzzle asks whether courts should regard the compensation prong as arising
from constitutional commands or prudential rm•fe,rer1cesY
The constitutional solution lo the 1Villiamson County ripeness puzzle
indudes two
First, courts sometimes think of rlpeness as a
constitutional command grounded in Article II!'s case-or-controversy
limitation, As the D.C. Circuit has explained: "Article Ill ... limits federal
court
to ca;,;es and controversies. Consistent with this limitation
and 'our theoretical role as the governmental branch of last resort,' the
ripeness doctrine precludes premature adjudication of 'abstract
disagreements' and instead reserves judicial power for resolution
and 'fully crystalit,ed' disputes."" The compensation prong could thus
rej>reserlt a jurisdictional
of what renders a federal takings claim
cognizable under Article III. 33
Second, in the context of the compensation prong, courts sometimes
think of ripeness as a constitutional command grounded in the Fifth
Amendment As Williamson County itself stated, "because the Fifth
Amendment proscribes takings without just compensation, no constitutional
violation occurs until just compensation has been denied." 34
compensation prong could thus represent a substantive element of what
renders a federal takings claim actionable.35
The prudential solution to the Williamson County ripeness puzzle turns
on a different understanding of the

where courts someth:nes think

of ripeness not as a constitutional command at all, but as a principle
gronnded in policy considerations. As the Second Circuit has explained:
"[W ]hen a court declares that a case is not prudentially ripe, it means that
the case 'Nill be better decided later .... It does not mean that the case is not
a real or concrete dispute affecting cognizable current concerns of the

31. rhc majority of this Part summariLe£ the
argument from my prcvjm1s
publication on the compcn&ation prong, Sec Crod:cr. supra note 4.
32. Va.ttdcrKam v. Vanderl<am, 776 F3d &83, 888 (LlC Cir" 2015) (citation tmlittt'll)
(quming Nut'l Treasury Emp.\ Union Y. G'nited States, 101 t:.3rll423, 1431 (D.C. Cir. 19%)).
33. $e-e Flying} Inc. v. City of New Haven, 549 F3d 538, 544 (7th. Cir. 2008) ('The
nf Wiiliam;;rm County is tllat there ls no case or mntroversy within the meaning of
until the plaintiff has pursued all available remedies m state cnurt .... ").
34.

473 U.S. 172, 194 n.B (!985).

35. See Clem: R, ~ichoi, Jr., Rip1.mcss aml :he Constituifo:n, 54 U. CHI. L REV. 153, 16470, 170 (1987). In Knirk, the Sohntnr Genernl Hied an amkw> lmefthat seems to embra;;e this
proug as arising fmm
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment hut that treats the
42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Brief for the lJnited States as Amicus
m St!pporl ofVacatm and
Remand al 19-21. Knick v. Twp. of Stott, No. 17-647 {U.S. fune 5, 2018). Respondents then
this apparently novcl
as welt Sec Brief for .ResponJems at 36, Knick, No. 17of Lhc tompen;;ation
for
July 30, 201 Bl. This
several reaf;t;nts, as KniCk's reply brief Jtscus.ses. Sec Petitioner's
4-9, Kotek, No.
17-647 (U.S. Aug. 24, 2018).
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within the meaning of Article I!I." 36 The compensation prong could thus rest
on the subconstilutional federalism concerns tbat San Remo Hole/ invokedspedftcally, that slate courts can adequately handle federal constitutional
challenges and
address property disputes. 37
In Knick, the Supreme Court should
the compensation prong as
prudential in character. For the descriptive re<~sons that follow, this would be
most consistent with the diret-lion of the Court's evolving statements on the

topic. And for the normative reasons that follow, this would put the
requirement in the hest light
which is important in case the
doctrine survives and to rest any potential rejection on the firmest
footing.
On a descriptive
the Supreme Court has taken several steps toward
ascribing a prudential makeup to the compensation prong, Rehnquist noted
this shill in his separate opinion in San Remo Hotel. In Williamson County,
Rehnquist recalled, the Court had "purported to interpret the Fifth
Amendment in divining [the compensation prong[." 1' But "[mJore recently,"
he
"we have referred to [the compensation prong] as merely a
prudentia) requirern:ent." 39
Rehnquist cited Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,40 which had
called the Williamson County requirements "prudential hurdles.'' 41 Before
San Rema Hotel, the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Cauncil42 had
also stated that a Williamson County issue went "only to the prudential
'ripeness' of [tbe plaintiffs] challenge." 41 And after San Remo
the
Court in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of
Environmental Protection 44 declared the compensation prong nonjurisrlktional.45 The Court made a sirnilar remark in Horne v.

of

Agnculture,4<• stating that "[a]lthough we often refer to [tbe compensation
prong] as prudential 'ripeness,' we have recognized that it is not, strictly
speaking, jurisdictional.''47
Accordingly, the trend in Supreme Court opinions
toward a
reimagining of the
prong as
in
This also
appears to have become the dominant position in the pages of academi~

36.
37.

SniHUI.Jfid;~

See Stewart

v_ lNS, 326 E3d 35L 357 (2d Cir, 2003).
l~. Sterk, The Demise

Utiga1ion, 48 WM. & MARY L

REV. 251,285 (2006).

38. San Rcmo Hotel, LP. v. City & Cty. of Sa11 l:ran;.;ist;-tl, 545 L'.S. 323, 349 (2005)
(Rehnqu!M, C.}., cou..:urring in the judgment).
39.
40.

Id.
520

41.

Suitum, 520 U.S. at 733-34.

42.
43.
44.

I.ucas, 505 U.S. at 1012-13.

45.

Stop the Read!, 560 l;'.S.at 719 &n.HL

46.
47.

569 u.s. 513 (2013).
1-Ionte, 569 U.S. Jt 526.

5()5
560

u.s. 725 (199/t

u.s. HJ()3 (!991).
u.s. 702 (2010].

46
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journa!s.4 H But in each case outlined above, the Court's comments were dicta
or failed to exclude an understanding of the
prong based in
the Fifth Amendment. 49 And
views continue to crop up in law
reviews."' This means that more than a decade alier Rehnquist criticized the
majority in San Remo Hotel for "conspicuously leav[ing] open" the question
whether the compensation prong "is merely a prudential rule, aod not a
constitutional mandate," 51 the question remains open today. 51
On a normative level, two points bear considering. First, textual and
historical arguments east doubt on the initial framing of the compensation
prong as part and parcel of the Fifth Amendment. 53 With respect to text,
there is a good argument that the "most natural[]" reading of the
amen,hnent is that "'compensation must
the
' and not
that 'the daimant shall have the opportunity to
the compensation
remedy in a post-taking court action.' "5'' And with respect to history, among
other things, commentators and judges have argued that "[d]uring the
century following the ratification of the Bill of Rights and parallel state
provisions~ courts held that compensation must be provided at the time of
the act ... alleged to be a taking.""

48.

See, e.g.,

J.

David Brecmer, The Rebirth of Federal

"Prudential" Answer to VVilHamson Onmty's J.Jawet.i State UtigatiorJ
Requirement:, 30
TOCRO L. REV. 319 {201-1); see also Merrill, supra note 1, at 1648-49, 1651-52
that
a prudential Sttlulion to the l•{fllianu;m County ripeness puzzle is
to
constitutional possibHity).
49. In Suitum anrl T.ucas, only the Wiiliarnsmr Courtly takings prong was at issue. See
Suitum v, Tahoe Reg'\
Agency, 520 U$. 725, 734 0997}; Lucas v. S.C. C'..oastal
Cnundl, 505 FS. HJ03, 1012-13
And
dedarlng the
non-jurisdictional
in Stop the Reach and F-lorne, the C.ourt
at most an
based in Article m,
for an undcrstaudmg bast'tl in the t:iilh Amendment "duel! not relate to jurisdicllondl
at
all." ~ichoi. supra note 35, at 162, Horne's statement also
have been dictum,
one
reason because the Court conduded that petitioners had no
and that theu
claim was
See 569 U.S.. at 527-28.

50.
W. Schwartz, j\'o Competing 'fheory !!( Corrst.itulinnal
Interpretation
34 S'l'A:.. ENVTL I..J. 247, 296 & n.l2.2
(20I5l (arguing that Slap
and Suilum "inn:rre\tly ,;haracterized lViUianL$1;ln County's
stat<.' <."ompensaHon n::quircmcnltls pmdential").
51. 545 U.S. 323, 351 n.2 (101J5} (Rdl.Hqu.ist, C.L mnt::urring in the judgnwnt).
52. Indeed. in dissenting from the .::ert denial in
Justke Thomas noted that
rule as a JuriMlktional nd~c'
"sen:ral Courts of Appeals continue to trt\11 the Wiliiamson
the courts' power to consider federal
claims
the plaintiff'< exhaust state'"nneJJes." 136 S. Ct. 1409, 1412 (2016) ('l'homas, J,, dissenting from denial of certiorari).
53.

See t\ferril[, supra note I, at 1647-49
136 S. Ct. at t4W (Timm<L".
Erecmcr,
V\"ilHamsnn

a sin>llar a>-gument).

J,

dL'iscnt.ing from denial of certiorari)

Procedures Rule:
l9mlrqsrary E:m~ditm Uprn
209, 219

the
(200311.
ss. ld, (quoting ). Dtwid Hrecmcr, Overcoming Williamson CQtmty's
Procedures Rule: How Jlre England Reservation, Issue Preclusion lixceptirms.,

State

47
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Second, vie1ving the compensation prong as prudential in character
would appear to inflict the least damage on litigants and courts. Prudential
rules, after all, are susceptible to exceptions based on policy considerations,
but constitutional rules defining the casc-or-controversy requirement or the
substantive merits of a claim generaJly are not 56
Commentators have found numerous reasons to criticize the
compensation prong. As one author notes, scholars have called it "deceptive,
inherently
draconian, and a Kafkaesque ma7.e, among other
unflattering things:'57 For purposes of iUustrating rather than exhausting the
doctrine's: possible adverse effe<:ts, therefore, consider two circumstances
that commentators have contended could cause the compensation prong to
produce steep and senseless consequences. The first concerns removal. and
the second concerns dafm preclusion,
First: removaL As justice Thomas recently explained, " [w]hen a plaintiff
files a suit in state court to exhaust his remedies as Williamson County
instructs; state-government entities and offidals may remove that suit to
federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441."58 But "[o]nce in federal court, some
state defendants have moved to dismiss on the ground that 'the plaintiff did
not litigate first in the state court."'59 An~ Thorn"''
some have
succeeded, with federal courts
claims instead of remanding
them. 60 Such "gamesmanship,'' Thomas argued, "leaves plaintiffs with no
court in which to pursue their claims. "61 A prudential understanding of the
compensation prong would allow courts to avoid this outcome.
hold, for example, that removing a federal takings claim from state court to
federal court causes the defendant to forfeit any compensation-prong
argumenL 62
Second: claim
San Remo Hotel focused on issue preclusion.
But commentators have contended that its reasoning could also lead to claim
preclusion in a meaningful number
thus keeping additional federal
takings claims out of federal court'; Foreclosing a federal forum for the

l:XceJtfiorr

the Federal Courllrouse Door fa Ripe

Claims, 18 J. LAt\D USE & L::-;rv. L

209,220 (20{1))).

56. Apparently for this reason will1 respect to Artidc m, in Am,goni, ThomJs frann:d
the Court's
at a prudential characterization of the compensation prong as an effort to
"a meliDrate
effeas." I d. at 1411.
57. Ian l;ein, Note, Why Judicial 'J'akings Are Unripe, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 749,774 (2011}
(mternal q_tto)lafk:m marks onutted); see also, e.g, Maureen E,
'1fu; Darnagfngs Ciuuses,
104 VA. L l{r.V. 341, 41JS

(201~)

(calling the compz•ns,ali<m prong

m~cs

of the most mahg>>cd

in condemnation law").
58. itrrigoni, 136 $.Cr. at 1411 (Thomas, J,, dissenting fmm denial of ccrt1omrt).
59. ld. (quoting Mki,ael M. !)crgcr & Gideon Kanm:r,. Shell Gumd 1"rru Can't Gt't 11~t•rc
from Here: Supn;me Cma·t Ripmi!JS
in Takings Casr':: at Iong l :.!$! R?ttchr:J thr

Self-l',r~rotiVSIUZC,

60.
61.

36 URB. LAW. 671, 673

Id.
Id.

62.

See Dreemer, suprJ1 note 48, at 342-45.

63.

See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 37, at 276-83.

48
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vindication of a federal constitutional right is problematic in itselt: Even
worse is tbe added possibility that a constitutional understanding of the
compensation prong could lead courts to forbid plaintiffs from bringing
federal
claims in state courts too.
To understand this possibility, return to the two potential constitutional
solutions to the Williamson County ripeness puzzle. For interpretations of
Article Ill, federal rules are generally viewed as inapplicable in state courts 61
But states can choose to adopt their own rules
equal or stricter
requirements.''' For inteqpretations of the Fifth Amendment, the same rules
apply in federal and state courts. Under either scenario, " [t}he federal ta~cin)tS
claim simply does not exist before the state inverse condemnation claim is
resolved, and may not, therefore, he considered alongside the state claim in
state court." 66
A plaintiff could try to avoid this possibility by bifurcating her claimsin particular, by litigating a predicate slate claim before bringing a federal
takings claim in state court. But it is possible that a state court would hold
that slate claim-preclusion rules do not allow such bifurcation. If federal
claim-preclusion rules would bar a federal takings claim in federal court,
then state claim-preclusion rules would presumably bar the same claim in
state court. Intersystem preclusion in federal court, after all, reflects the
intrasystem preclusion rules of the judgment-rendering state. 67
Combining a constitutional wlution to the Williamson County ripe:nes;s
puzzle with the possibility of state-court claim preclusion thus presents a
situation where a federal takings claim could
"go from green to
rotten without ever being ripe."'" A prudential solution, however, would
allow courts to
this
hy permitting plaintif(s !o prosecute

66. Kathryn E,
Federal Courts'
ECOLOGY LQ.l. l3

Kova~.;;,

Accepting the
Attempts to

Chlims ro Stt~te Courts: The
Wiiliamsnn County, 26

67. .)ee Allen v. ~kCurry, 449 P.S. 90., 96 ( 1980)
that under the Full Faith and
Crerlit Statt1te\ "Congress has sper:itlca.lly
all federal .:ourts to
predosive eHEct to
stale-court
whenever the coorls of the Stale from which
judgment:; enu:rgcd
would do
hR John Martinez & Karen L Mutincz, A Prudential Theory for Providing a Forum for
Federal
Claims, 36 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J, 445, 431 (2001)> see also Michael ~L
lkrgcr & Gideon Kanner, Shdl Gmm;t r<m Cnn 't ('JCt
Jur'is~>ruu!ctLAt in
Cases at Long Last Reaches the Self-P<lrO<.lv
709-10 {2004). There are
workdrounds for thi~; quagmire,
is why f treat thi"
situation as a prn;sibility r;tth1:rti<an a cert.ainty.
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predicate state claims and federal takings claims side-by-side in state courts.
Rehnquist made a similar point in San Rema Hotel. The majority assumed in
dictum that Williamson County did not apply in state courts.69 This
assumption could correct, Rehnquist said, only if the compensation prong
re]>reset>!ed "a prudential rule" rather than "a constitutional mandate,"70
In short, fhe compensation prong is best viewed as a prudential rule, and
the Supreme Court should analyze it as such in Knick.
IlL THE TREND TOWARD RBPIJD!AT!NG PRUDENTIAL PRINCIPLES

The Supreme Court has

prudential limitations on federal

jurisdiction in two recent cases: Lexmark International, Inc, v. Static Control

Components, lnc.' 1 and Susan B. Anthony List v. Driei!aus. 72
In Lexmark, the Court (unanimously) said that the concept of prudential
standing "is ln some tension with ... the principle that 'a federal court's

obligation to hear and decide' cases within its jurisdiction 'is virtually
unflagging."' 73 The Court stated that "[jjust as a court cannot apply its
independent policy judgment to recognize a cause of action that Cc·mpres"
has denied, it cannot limit a cause of action that Congress has created nu::rd)·
because 'prudence' dictates."" The Court concluded that the "zone-ofinterests" inquiry, which asks whether a cause of action "encompasses a

particular plaintiffs
" was a doctrine of statutory h1terpretati011 rather
than of prudential standing,75
In Susan B. Anthony List, the Court (again unanimou..dy) criticized
prudential
by
Lexmark. In particular, the Court
"[t]o
the extent respondents would have us deem petitioners' daims
that are prudential, rather than constitutional,'
nonjttsticiable 'on
'fhat request is in some tension with our recent reaffirmation of fhe principle
fhat a federal court's obligation to hear and decide' cases within its
jurisdiction 'is virtually unflagging.' "76 But the Court concluded that it did
not need to resolve the "continuing vitality" of the dnctrine in question
because the rest was "easily satisfied" in favor of "prompt judicial review" in
the case at bar ,77

69.

5t',e San Remo Hotel, LP, v, City & Cty. u[San

Frand~u.

545 \:.S. 323, 346 12005),

70.

compensation
7!. 572 IJ.S. 1!8 (2014),
72. 134 S. <:c 2334 (2014).
73. Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 126 {som>: internal qootaUon marks onntted) (quotmg $punt
Commc'ns, Iru:. v. Jamhs., !l7l U.S. 69,77 (20l3)).

ld.at l28(dtulionomiHed},
75. ld. at L27.
76. Sus(m 13. Attflwny J,lst, 134 S. Cr. at 2347 (altt--ralion ami some inb:mal quotation
marks omitted) (quotirig Li'xmark, 527 U.S, at 125-26).
74.

77.

Td. at2347,
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The sentiments expressed in Lexmark and Susan B. Anthony List carry
an uncertain but potentially significant scope} as commentators have noted. 78
On the one hand, Chief
Marshall stated the classic principle that
federal courts have "no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction
which is given, than to usurp that which is not
" for either "would be
treason to the constitution."" But on the other,
Supreme Court has long
recognized "judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal
jurisdiction."80 These "entrenched
seem to "self-evidently
contlict[]" where courts can decline to adjudicate cases be<:ause of prudential
considerations, 81
So where can courts decline to adjudicate cases because of prudential
considerations? Nobody can answer this question in a universal and
universally
way because "the boundaries between .;onstitutional,
prudential, and statutory limits are not generally
" but "are often
blurred, porous, and contested."" It should come as little surprise, therefore,
fhat fhe list of rules fhat have been identitled as
prudential is long,
Consider the following
which are
a sampling of
recent scholarship examining doctrines that the Supreme Court or some of
its members have treated as prudential:
• The general prohibition against third-party standing,
• The zone-of-interests standing test as applied to constitutional
daims;
• The standing prohibition on assert:inggerter~cllz<ed gtriev•an<:es,
• The taxpayer-standing do<::! nne.
• The standing rule for federnl-guestion eases about domestic
relations}

•
•

The
doctrine examining the fitness of the issues for
review and the
to the parties of delay,
At least some aspects

•

The adverseness requirement~

• At least some aspects of the political-question doctrine,
• Abstention do·ctrines,
• Some aspects of state sovereign immunity, and
• The act-of-state doctrine.83
To clarify, my point is not that these doctrines actually rest on
prudential concerns. Indeed, the Court or some Justices have framed several

7R. See, e.g., Crrn:l«tr, supra note 4, at 175-76; ErncJ;t A. Young, Prudemial Stmntlil•tg
tl}ler Lexmark Intematiomd, Im:. v. Static C.onrrol Components, Inc., lO DUKE J. Co:xsT. L.
PURPOL'Y 149(20l4).

79.
81.
82.

Cohens v. Vltginla. 19 U-S- (6 Wheat.) 2M. 404 (l821l.
Allen v.
737, 751 ( 1984).
Smith, supra note 5, at 847-48;
supra note 78, at 161.
Smith, supra note 5, at 851.

83.

See id. at 855-69; Young, supra note 78, at 150-63.

80.

u.s.
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of these issues in constitutional or statutory terms. 84 My point is instead that
the dividing lines are disputed and often indistinct-and that far-flung
limitations on federal jurisdiction are thus regarded as at least possibly
prudential in character. The upshot is that
criticisms nfprudential
swath
doctrine. 85
principlescould destabilize a
Litigants have already
on the Court's recent statements to cast
beyond those at issue in Lexmark
doubt on purportedly prudential
and Susan B. Anthony List. A prominent example occurred in Starr
International Co. v. United States, 86 in which Da,;d Boies and Paul Clement
joined forces wilh others before the Supreme Court to challenge the general
rule against third-party standing."
they said, concluded that
"federal courts shonld not decline to hear and decide cases within their
jurisdiction based on grounds that are 'prudential' rather than
constitutional." 88 The Court denied cert in Starr, but the case generated a
notable amount of apparent interest, including an unrequested response
from the Solicitor General and a rescheduled spot on the Court's conference
agenda. 89
At bottom, as one scholar puts the matter, "[i]f the federal cnurts'
jurisdictional obligations are meant to be truly 'unflagging,' a great deal of
established doctrine will have to go,""' For the Supreme Court to echo in
Knick the sentiments expressed in Lexmark and Susan B. Anthony List would
encourage broadside attacks on a wide range of jurisdictional doctrines.
IV. A PRJJDENT!At PATH FORWARD
In light
concerns about the trend toward repudiating prudential
principles, how should the Supreme Court approach Knick and other rases
that concern possibly prudential limitations on federal jurisdiction?
In Knick, there is no need to color outside the lines of the compensation
prong. Even if one sees the requirement as prudential in
wellestablished principles support overruling Williamson Cormty without
overhauling jurisdictional jurisprudence.

84.

85.

8ee Smith, supra note 5, al 855-69: Young, SHpra note 78, at 153-55, 161-62.
See Jod S. Nolette, Last
Prudential
Lexmark and [t;/nif'li"!liOIU,

16 CEO. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 227, 237-53 (2018)
ex~Jiding Lesmark

86.

posstblc "Jomluu

of

(deaned up)),

856 JC.3J 953,957 (Fed. CiL 2017), cz>rt denied, 138 S. Ct. 1324 {2018) {mcm.).

-See Nok>tte, supra note 85, at 236-37 (Jisctt:;:;ing Starr as pres~c•tHing an opportunity
to tlcsh out the implications ofLr;,;x:mnrk).
87.

88.

Petihon for Writ uf Certiorari at 17, Starr Int'l Co. v. t;ulte:d States, 138: S. Ct 1324

(2017) (mern.) (No. 17-540).

89. 8i!<! Docket Search, SUP. Cr., https://WW\V..,.upremecourtgov/reardLaspx?
ftlena:me""! docket/ dot-ketftles/html/public/17- 54fJ.html: Ihttps:! /perma.ccl KP1' 4- D D99}.
90.
supra note 78, at t6t. I
to ground the
wne-of-interests
more squarely in
intent" ld. at 163.
also agree that
"the majority's discussion may spur far-reaching
in l;(r\\'
think and (cspeda:llrJ
Id. all49.
lalkabtHJl

52

Michigan Law Review Online

(VoL 117:39

"Beyond workability," the Court has explained, "the relevant factors in
deciding whether to adhere to the principle of stare decisis include the
antiquity of the precedent} the reliance interests at stake, and of course

whether the decision was well reasoned." 91
Applying these factors here, the compensation prong has
unworkable for reasons revealed in San Remo Hotel and other
The
Court appears to have more often avoided than approved the doctrine. 93 Any
reliance interests seem attenuated and ambiguous. 94 And there is much
agt·eetnelll that Williamson County "cannot be correct, at least on its own
terms."95 To quote four justices from San Remo Hotel: "It is not obvious that
either constitutional or prudential principles require claimants to utilize all
state compensation
before they can bring a federal takings
claim."96 As for constitntional
(and as discussed
the initial
orientation of the compensation prong around the Fifth Amendment suffers
from textual and historical suspicions. 97 And an understanding based in the
Fifth Amendment or Artide HI could cause perverse consequences. 98 As for

prudential principles, to quote the same four Justices: the Court still "has not
explained why we should hand authority over federal
claims to state
local land-use
courts, based simply on their relative familiarity
decisions and proceedings, while allowing plaintiffs to proceed directly to
federal court in cases involving, for example, challenges to municipal landuse regnlations based on the Fh't Amendment or the Equal Protection
Clause." 99 Nor, it seems, could the Court do so. 11}i)

91. Mnnte-Jo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792-93 (2009). The Supreme CAJmt ha£ outlined
other
formulations for approaching the prindpit: of stare Jecisiti, but this i~ an emch:nt
formulation that works well here,
92. For an interesting: inventory ot s,omc settings when? the compensation prong and a
context create work.ahiUty concerns, sec
related principle applicable in the
Merrill, supra note 1, at 165:5-66,
93.

See id. at 1634-36.

scheme c::::,:~,~~~~~,!g:m;;;rcrnment
officials to
would
engage in. But nne

94.

One could surmise that the ;;.:urrent
in :more extensive property re<>trki:inns than
also surmise lhe op}X;tSile. SeeM at 1667-69.

95. Michad W. McCAJnndJ, Home aml the NormaUzation
Rtsporue to
[u;lwverria, 43 E)JVTL L. REP. 10749, 10751

one can

argue that because of preclusion rules, "there was nothing 'premature' about the takings ctalrr1s
in [!.Villiarnson County], at least if premature is read to mean, as it nalun>IIY
that the
claim can become matmx; (or
at oorne
in the future." John Ed1cv•:rria. Horne v.
Department of
lnvilulhm tv
noctritte tn TakingJ
Liligation, 43 ENVTL L. REP. 10735,10743 (2013).

96. San Remo Hotel, LP. v. City 8r Cly. ot
( Rehnquisl~ C.J., concurring in the Judgment).
97.
98.

99.

I:mncl<>CO:. 545 t:'.S. 323, 3-49 (2005)

See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
See supra text acarmpany:ing notes 57-70.
$an R¢ttt0 Uutrl, S45 U,5, al 350-Sl (1\elm<,]Uh<l, C,f., concurring in the jodgm.;;nt)

(dtahons omitted).
100.

S~u1

See McConnell, supru note 95, at 10751.
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I generally advocate rejecting or limiting dubious doctrines that prevent
parties from enforcing their constitutional rights or prerogalives. 101 But the

sheer number and impurt of doctrines potentially put at risk should caution
the Court against rejecting the compensation prong based on broad
Perhaps the Court should ultimately
objections to prudential rules at
abandon some ostensihly
rules. But it should not do so-or
encourage lower courts to act along simllar lines-through a
focuses on one narro'\\' and idiosyncratic issue (iike Knick).

case that

Moreover, misgivings about applying prudential principles could push
courts toward recaLegorizing jurisdictional doctrines as stemming from

constitutional or statutory roots. Rut doing so has important real-world
effects. Deeming doctrines constitutional "lock[s) Congress out of dialogues
about how to eliminate or operationalize federal jurisdictional limits," whkh
may "harm!] congressional efforts to expand access to federal courts" and
"raises its own set of democratic concerns:'w::: And deeming doctrines
statutory cmnpels defendants to ralse then1 early in the litigation process.
requires state courts to abide by them~ and subjects state decisions to

Supreme Court reviewY" To be dear, there are good arguments that courts
should conceptualize certain jurisdictional doctrines with fuzzy foundations
as constitutional or statutory requirements. But courts should not rush into
such rulings simply because of a rapid repudiation of prudential principles.
Put dilJerently, it is "highly doubtful" that every principle in the
jurisdictional context that someone attempts to characterize as prudential
would "go by the wayside" were the Court to continue castigating or even to
cast aside prudential limitations in Knick. 101 At a minimmn, courts would
likely sort some rules into constitutional or statutory buckeL;;. The primary
problem is that many rules would lie in doubt in the meantime. And a
secondary problem is that rebranding possibly prudential areas as
constitutional or statutory in charncter could cause other unintended and
unwelcome consequences.

In Knick, therefore, the Court should regard the
prong as
prudential in ;;haracter but reject it for independent reasons. And beyond
the Court should ra:onsider other purportedly prndentiallimitations
on federal
in cases that more squarely
them.w

101. .See Cmckt:r, supra note 4; Katherine Mims Crocker,
lnm:uniry and
CUM$tltUtiNtal $tructure, 117 MICH. L REV.
2019}; Kathenne Mhns Cro.:ker,
Note, Securing 501'Cre(t;n
97 VA. L Rr.v. 2051
ll"
102. Smith, supra note 5, at R7K
103.
stipm note 78, at 159-60.
104.

ld. at 163.

105. It bears mentioning 1hat rny vk"'>¥' of how and
the Court should reJect the
compensation prong m Knick vis-a-vis Hs possible status as A
contradicts
the apparent viC:\\' of at tcast one other observer. See Jod
Knick v.
of Scott,
PcJmsylvauia:
"Treasorr to the Cmrs:tifu!ion," LEAST DAl\G£ROL1S llT.OG
Hh
2018),
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CONC LUSIO

Knick presents an opportunity to overturn the Williamson County
compensation prong, which requires would-be federal takings plaintiffs to
"ripen" their claims by pursuing state procedures for seeking just
compensation. The Supreme Court should seize this opportunity, but it
should do so in a specific way. The Court should view the compensation
prong as prudential rather than constitutional in character and discard it as
poorly imagined and sorely impractical. V·-lere the Court instead to eliminate
the requirement because of opposition to prudential limitations on federal
jurisdiction in general, a cascade of negative effects for doctrines far and
wide could follow.

